Without any assumption on the cover source, this paper presents a complete characterization of all perfectly secure stego-systems that employ mutually independent embedding operation. It is shown that for a fixed embedding operation, the only perfectly secure stegosystems are those whose cover distribution is an element of a linear vector space with basis vectors determined by the embedding operation. Moreover, we also prove that such stego-systems are perfectly secure if and only if the Fisher information with respect to the embedding change rate is zero and thus Fisher information can be seen as an equivalent descriptor of steganographic security. This result is important for deriving steganographic capacity of imperfect stegosystems with covers modeled as Markov chains [1] . It also suggests that Fisher information could be used for benchmarking.
INTRODUCTION
In steganography, the sender and receiver communicate by hiding their messages in generally trusted media, such as digital images, so that one cannot distinguish between the original (cover) objects and the objects carrying the message (stego objects). Formally, the security of a stego-system is evaluated using the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the distributions of cover and stego objects [2] . Systems with zero KL divergence are called perfectly secure.
Formally, a stego-system is a combination of an embedding algorithm and a cover source. The vast majority of practical stegosystems hide messages by modifying individual cover elements using mutually independent embedding operations, e.g., LSB and ±1 embedding, F5 algorithm, perturbed quantization, MMx, stochastic modulation, and many others (see [3] and the references therein).
In this paper, we provide a complete characterization of perfectly secure stego-systems for the class of embedding algorithms that employ mutually independent (MI) embedding operations. The cover distributions of all perfectly secure systems form a linear vector space spanned by distributions determined by the embedding operation. Moreover, we show that perfect security (zero KL divergence) is equivalent to satisfying a simple condition related to Fisher information. This result suggests that Fisher information can be used as an equivalent descriptor of steganographic security.
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In Section 2, we introduce the notation and definitions and review some preliminary facts. Section 3 and Section 4 contain the main results, as well as illustrative examples. Section 5 states the main results for the special case of Markov chain cover sources. Section 6 concludes the paper.
NOTATION, PRELIMINARIES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
We use x n 1 (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X n , X = {1, . . . , N} to represent an n-element cover object, obtained as a realization of random variable X n 1 ∼ P where P is the distribution of covers over X n . Similarly, the stego object y n 1 (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ X n is a realization of random variable Y n 1 ∼ Q β , where β is a scalar parameter capturing the extent of embedding changes (It will be helpful to think of β as the change rate.).
The definition of steganographic security was given by Cachin [2] .
Definition 1 Steganography is perfectly secure iff
We assume that the impact of embedding with parameter β ∈ [0, β0] on the k-th element can be captured using the matrix bi,j(β) P r(Y k = j|X k = i) = δi,j + βci,j, for some constants ci,j ≥ 0 for i = j, ci,i = − j ci,j, where δi,j is the Kronecker delta. In a matrix form, B β = I + βC, where B β (bi,j(β)), I is the identity matrix, and C (ci,j). We further assume that embedding operations are mutually independent, P r(Y
. By the definition of bi,j, the matrix B β is stochastic, j bi,j = 1. Finally, we assume that bi,i(β) > 0 for all β ∈ [0, β0]. The matrix B β represents an embedding algorithm with MI embedding operation (simply MI embedding). Many embedding methods can be formulated within this framework (see examples in Figure 1) .
To simplify the language in this paper, we will speak of security of a cover source w.r.t. a given MI embedding meaning that the cover source is perfectly secure w.r.t. B, if the resulting stego-system is perfectly secure. It does then make sense to inquire about all possible perfectly secure cover sources w.r.t. MI embedding with matrix B β .
We now review some results from the theory of ergodic classes borrowed from [4] that will be later applied to the stochastic matrix B β . For states i, j ∈ X , we call j a consequent of i (of order k) (i → j) iff ∃k, (B k β )i,j = 0. State i ∈ X is transient if it has a consequent of which it is not itself a consequent, i.e., ∃j ∈ X such that (i → j) ⇒ (j → i). We say i ∈ X is non-transient if it is a consequent of every one of its consequents, ∀j ∈ X , (i → j) ⇒ (j → i). The set X can be decomposed as X = F ∪ E1 ∪ · · · ∪ E k , where F is the set of all transient states and Ea, a ∈ {1, . . . , k}, are so called ergodic classes. We put two non-transient states into one ergodic class if they are consequents of each other. Let matrix B β have k ergodic classes. Then, there exist k linearly independent left eigenvectors, denoted as π
> 0 for all i ∈ Ea, and π (a) i = 0 otherwise. Every other π satisfying πB β = π is obtained by a convex linear combination of {π (a) |a ∈ {1, . . . , k}}. For a complete reference, see [4, Chapter V, §2]. The set of ergodic classes for matrix B β depends only on the set {(i, j)|bi,j(β) = 0}. Since bi,j(β) = 0 iff ci,j = 0 for i = j and bi,i(β) > 0 for β ∈ (0, β0], the structure of ergodic classes does not depend on β. Moreover, if πB β = π for some β > 0, then πC = 0 and thus all invariant distributions are independent of β, because πB β = πI + β πC = πI = π. By this reason, we frequently omit the index β.
PERFECTLY SECURE COVER SOURCES UNDER MUTUALLY INDEPENDENT EMBEDDING OPERATION
In this section, we let matrix B represent an arbitrary MI embedding with k ergodic classes Ea and invariant distributions π (a) , a ∈ {1, . . . , k}. The following example describes a construction of perfectly secure cover sources w.r.t. B.
Example 2 [Perfectly secure cover sources] Let P
(2) be a probability distribution on 2-element cover objects defined as
is a perfectly secure cover source w.r.t. B because
and thus both distributions P (2) , and Q We next show that there are no other linearly independent perfectly secure cover sources w.r.t. B.
Theorem 3 [Mutually independent embedding]
There are exactly k n linearly independent perfectly secure probability distributions P on n-element covers. Every perfectly secure probability distribution P w.r.t. B can be obtained by a convex linear combination of k n linearly independent perfectly secure distributions described in Example 2.
Proof It is sufficient to prove that there cannot be more than k n linearly independent perfectly secure probability distributions P on n-element covers. We show the proof for n = 2 and later present its generalization.
We define the following matrices P (pi,j), pi,j = P (X 2 1 = (i, j)), and Q (qi,j), qi,j = Q β (Y 2 1 = (i, j)). By defininition of MI embedding, we have
If p is defined as one big row vector of elements pi,j and similarly q, then assuming perfect security of cover source w.r.t. B (P = Q), we have q = p D = p and thus p is left eigenvector of D corresponding to 1. Matrix D is stochastic and thus it is sufficient to show that it has k 2 ergodic classes. We first show that
By u This proof can be generalized for n ≥ 3 by proper definition of matrices P, Q, and D. In general, matrix D has size N n × N n . By similar construction we obtain k n ergodic classes of generalized matrix D, however we know k n linearly independent distributions.
PERFECT SECURITY AND FISHER INFORMATION
In this section, we show that for stego-systems with MI embedding perfect security can be captured using Fisher information. From Taylor expansion of KL divergence, for small β, d(β) = 1 2
is the Fisher information w.r.t. β. If for some stego-system d(β) = 0 for β ∈ [0, β0], then I(0) = 0 from the Taylor expansion. Even though the opposite does not hold in general, we will prove that for MI embedding zero Fisher information implies perfect security. In other words, a stego-system with MI embedding is perfectly secure for β ∈ [0, β0] if and only if I(0) = 0. This provides us with a simpler condition for verifying perfect security than the KL divergence. Fisher information also provides a connection to quantitative steganalysis because 1/I(β) is the lower bound on variance of unbiased estimators of β. Moreover, I(0) could be used for comparing (benchmarking) stego-systems.
We start by reformulating the condition I(0) = 0.
Proposition 4 Let P and Q β be probability distributions of cover and stego objects with n elements embedded with parameter β. The Fisher information is zero if and only if the FI-condition is satisfied
Proof The second derivative of d(β) at β, d (β), can be written as
where Q β (y
, the first term in the bracket in (3) sums to zero at β = 0, and thus I(0) is zero iff Q β (y n 1 ) β=0 = 0 is zero for all y n 1 ∈ X n for which P (n) (y n 1 ) > 0 as was to be proved. Here, we assume the KL divergence d(β) to be continuous w.r.t. β which is valid by the construction of the matrix B.
The next theorem shows that the FI condition (2) is equivalent with perfect security for MI embedding.
Theorem 5 [Fisher information condition]
There are exactly k n linearly independent probability distributions P on n-element covers satisfying the FI condition (2) . These distributions are perfectly secure w.r.t. B. Every other probability distribution P satisfying (2) can be obtained by a convex linear combination of k n linearly independent perfectly secure distributions.
Proof From Example 2, we know k n linearly independent perfectly secure distributions. By Taylor expansion of d(β), these distributions satisfy the FI condition, because d(β) = 0 ⇒ I(0) = 0. It is sufficient to show that there cannot be more linearly independent distributions satisfying the FI condition.
Similarly as in the previous proof, we reformulate the theorem as eigenvector problem and use ergodic class theory to give the exact number of left eigenvectors corresponding to 1. Again, we present the proof for the case n = 2 and then show how to generalize it.
If P satisfies (2), then the linear term in the Taylor expansion of Q β (y 
We define matrix P (pi,j) as pi,j = P (X 2 1 = (i, j)) and represent it as a row vector p. If we define matrix
and diagonal matrix (4) can be written in a compact form as p D = p G. Both matrices D and G are non-negative by their definitions.
Let
then matrix H is stochastic and p H = p iff p D = p G and thus (2) is equivalent with an eigenvalue problem for matrix H. First, we observe that for i = j cij > 0 iff h (i,a),(j,a) > 0 for all a ∈ X , because by (5) h (i,a),(j,a) = γd (i,a),(j,a) = γcij (the first case when u2 = v2). Similarly, for i = j cij > 0 iff h (a,i),(a,j) > 0 for all a ∈ X (the second case when u1 = v1). This means that i → j iff (i, a) → (j, a) w.r.t. H for all a ∈ X and similarly i → j iff (a, i) → (a, j) w.r.t. H for all a ∈ X. This can be proved by using the previous statement. By this rule used for a given u 1 ∈ E × F ∪ F × F. This proof can be generalized for n ≥ 3 by assuming larger matrices P, D, G, and H, obtaining exactly k n linearly independent perfectly secure distributions satisfying the FI condition.
Next, we discuss the structure of the set of invariant distributions for a given MI embedding and show how to find ergodic classes from matrix B in practice. By Theorem 2.1 from [4, Chapter V, page 175], this can be done by inspecting the matrix limit M = (mi,j) = limn→∞
i . According to this theorem, state i is non-transient iff mi,i > 0 and is transient otherwise. We put two non-transient states i, j ∈ X into one ergodic class if mi,j > 0. All rows of the matrix M corresponding to states in one ergodic class Ea are the same and equal to the invariant distribution of this class, π (a) . This section is closed with a short discussion of two practical embedding algorithms. For the F5 embedding algorithm [5] , the set of states X = {−1024, . . . , 1024}. By the nature of the embedding changes (flip towards 0), there is only one ergodic set E1 = {0} and F = X \ {0}. Thus, there is only one invariant distribution, π0 = 1 and zero otherwise. Obviously, no message can be embedded in covers with this singular distribution.
For the case of LSB embedding over X = {0, . . . , 255}, we have Ea = {2a, 2a + 1} for a ∈ {0, . . . , 127}, F = ∅ and π and zero otherwise (LSB embedding cannot be detected in images with evened out histogram bins). Thus, sources realized as a sequence of mutually independent random variables with such a distribution are the only perfectly secure sources w.r.t. LSB embedding. Figure 1 shows examples of matrices B and ergodic classes of several known algorithms with MI embedding operation.
APPLICATION TO MARKOV COVER SOURCES
In this section, we reformulate the results obtained so far for a special type of cover sources that can be modeled as first-order stationary Markov Chains (MC). The results play a key role in proving the square root law of steganographic capacity of imperfect stegosystems for Markov covers [1, 6] .
First, for stationary cover sources Theorem 3 leads to this immediate corollary.
Corollary 6
There are exactly k (instead of k n ) linearly indpendent perfectly secure stationary cover sources. These sources are i.i.d. with some invariant distribution πa, a ∈ 1, . . . , k.
The next corollary states that in order to study perfect security of n-element stationary MC covers, it is enough to study only 2-element covers.
Corollary 7 Let P , Q β be first-order stationary MC cover distribution and its corresponding stego distribution after MI embedding with parameter β. For a given n ≥ 2, an n-element stego-system is perfectly secure iff the corresponding stego-system narrowed to 2-element cover source is perfectly secure for some β0 > 0:
Moreover, the FI condition for Markov sources simplifies to
Proof Because invariant distributions do not depend on β, Equation (6) must be valid for all β > 0 once it holds for some β0 (see the arguments at the end of Sec. 2). By Corollary 6, if the stego-system is perfectly secure (n ≥ 2), then the cover source is i.i.d. with some invariant distribution w.r.t. MI embedding and thus (6) and (7) hold. On the other hand, if (6) and (7) hold for n = 2 and stationary cover source, then this cover source is i.i.d. with one of k invariant distributions. This completes the proof since 2-element marginal is sufficient statistics for a first-order stationary MC.
CONCLUSION
Most practical stego-systems for digital media embed messages by making independent changes to individual cover elements. In this paper, we fix the embedding operation and then inquire in which cover sources the embedding is statistically undetectable in Cachin's sense. The main contribution of this paper is a complete geometric characterization of such sources. Using the theory of ergodic classes, we show that all cover sources that are perfectly secure with respect to mutually independent embedding form a vector space spanned by invariant distributions determined by the embedding operation. Additionally, we showed that perfect security of stegosystems with mutually independent embedding is completely captured using Fisher information formulated in Section 4 as the FI condition. This result not only provides a simpler and equivalent condition for perfect security, but it finds further applications in steganalysis. For example, Fisher information could be used for benchmarking such stego-systems, a direction we intend to pursue in our future research. Moreover, Fisher information provides fundamental lower bounds on the variance of unbiased estimators of the change rate, which connects our results to problems in quantitative steganalysis. Finally, the FI condition plays a key role in proving the square root law of steganographic capacity of imperfect stego-systems [1, 6] .
